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Abstract 
In this paper, based on a three-factor, two-level constant elasticity of substitution production 
function, we develop an endogenous skill-biased innovation model using the neoclassical growth 
model to analyze the dynamics of income inequalities. Stiglitz (2014) argued that the formulation 
of the induced skill-biased innovation is a promising research approach for analyzing the various 
inequalities in OECD countries, but did not extend the model analysis. Extending the innovation 
possibility frontier that has a skill-biased innovation type, we investigate the dynamic properties 
of income inequality and labor shares in the growth model. We show that capital–skill 
complementarity production technology and the possible shift in the induced innovation 
possibility frontier incorporating the externality of capital accumulation play significant roles in 
the dynamics and stability of labor shares and inequalities. The implications of the heterogeneity 
of population growth on the equilibrium skill-biased innovation and dynamics of inequality are 
also investigated. 
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1. Introduction 
Parallel to the widespread inequality in advanced countries, there has been a growing literature 
on skill-biased technology and inequality.1 Among these studies, having analyzed the dynamics 
of technical unemployment in the framework of the induced factor-biased of innovation, Stiglitz 
(2014) argued that the formulation of the induced skill-biased innovation is a promising research 
approach for analyzing the various inequalities in OECD countries. One of the implications of the 
induced innovation framework in line with Kennedy (1964) and Samuelson (1965) is that 
relatively increasing the factor share can induce firms to introduce their own factor-augmenting 
technical progress in the maximization of the instantaneous cost reduction rate of change on the 
concavity of the innovation frontier. In this setting, an increase in the capital share of income 
relative to the labor share of income, for instance, leads to a bias toward capital-augmenting 
technical progress. If the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is smaller than unity, 
the steady state is stable, which reduces the capital share and leads to lower capital-augmenting 
innovation. However, if the elasticity of substitution is larger than unity, the long-run equilibrium 
is unstable, and thus this capital-augmenting technical progress further increases the capital share 
without bounds. Stiglitz (2014) conjectured that the same logic can apply to the case of the 
innovation of augmenting skilled labor and unskilled labor. In other words, an increase in the 
income of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor can lead to skill-biased innovation. If the 
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is larger than unity, skill-biased 
technology further increases the skilled labor income, which induces even more skill-biased 
innovation.  
However, to consider formally how this conjecture affects the induced skill-biased innovation 
in a growth economy, at least two modifications are needed. The first is a three-factor framework 
and the associated elasticity of substitution in the three-factor case. In a growth model, capital 
accumulation plays a role in the dynamics and associated income inequalities. Therefore, the 
analysis of induced skill-biased innovation needs a three-factor framework including capital stock. 
In such a framework, the substitutability and complementarity among skilled, unskilled labor and 
capital play significant roles in the stability of the steady state and formulation of endogenous 
biased innovation and inequality. Under three-factor production structures, the economy has the 
widely estimated relevant capital-skill complementarity structure that implies an elasticity of 
substitution between capital and skilled labor smaller than unity but that of substitution between 
                                                     
1 See Acemoglu (2002) and Hornstein et al. (2005). Recent studies have examined capital-
augmenting technical progress as an improvement in automation and artificial intelligence 
technologies. See Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017a, 2017b), Kotlikoff and Sachs (2012), Graetz 
and Michaels (2015), and Korinek and Stiglitz (2017). In this paper, as an exogenous parameter, 
we analyze the impact of capital-augmenting technology on skill-biased innovation and income 
inequality. 
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capital and unskilled labor larger than unity.2 Hence, we investigate the stability condition of the 
steady state and examine how the induced skill-biased innovation and associated income 
inequality behave in the dynamic system. 
The second modification is the innovation possibility frontier.3 The weakness of the innovation 
possibility frontier is that it does not have the possibility of shifting.4 This weakness makes the 
determination of the growth rate unrealistic as well as ensures the constancy of biased 
technologies and of the factor income ratio at the steady state. In particular, the latter case is 
produced by the unique relationship between skill-augmenting technical progress and the factor 
income ratio, which is derived from the maximization of the instantaneous cost reduction rate of 
change on the concavity of the stationary innovation frontier. Therefore, in this stationary 
innovation frontier framework, skill-biased innovation and income inequality do not change 
unless the frontier curve shifts or the growth economy is in a transitional state. 
To address these two respects, based on a three-factor framework with a two-level constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function that can capture relevant capital–skill 
complementarity technology,5 we develop endogenous skill-biased innovation using Solow’s 
(1956) standard neoclassical growth model to analyze the dynamics of income inequalities. As 
noted, Stiglitz (2014) conjectured about the skill-biased innovation, but did not extend the model 
analysis. Developing the possible shift in the innovation possibility frontier in line with Kennedy 
(1964), Samuelson (1965), and Drandakis and Phelps (1966) as well as assuming a tradeoff 
relationship between skill-augmenting and unskilled-augmenting technical progress, 6  we 
investigate the characteristics of the induced skill-biased innovation and dynamic properties of 
income inequality and labor shares in the three-factor growth model. 
Further, according to the formulation of Adachi et al. (2019), we develop the induced 
innovation frontier incorporating the externality of capital accumulation that can expand outward 
at the innovation frontier.7 R&D activity can be embodied in the new capital stock, and thus we 
implicitly take account of this property as the possible shift in the innovation frontier. Developing 
these modifications, our model can then analyze growth and inequality in the induced innovation 
framework. 
Our three main results are as follows. First, capital–skill complementarity technology and the 
shift in the innovation possibility frontier play significant roles in the stability of the steady state 
                                                     
2 See Krusell et al. (2000) and Duffy et al. (2004). 
3 See Acemoglu (2010) and Korinek and Stiglitz (2017). 
4 See Nordhaus (1973) and Acemoglu (2015).  
5 For pioneering works, see Griliches (1969) and Sato (1967).  
6  Caselli and Coleman (2006) considered the same type of frontier in capital–skill 
complementarity. However, they did not analyze the induced biased innovation. 
7 Samuelson (1965) suggested that the capital share of income can be one of the shift parameters 
of the innovation possibility frontier. 
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and dynamics of labor shares and wage inequality. The stability is fulfilled with some empirically 
relevant capital–skill complementarity and this steady state is oscillatory. This finding implies 
that even if the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is larger than unity, 
which is the empirically relevant case,8 when the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
skilled labor is smaller than unity, the steady state becomes stable. Hence, there is no biased 
innovation at this steady state. However, the induced skill-biased innovation can occur in the 
transitional state. 
Second, when the innovation frontier does not shift, the induced skill-biased innovation and 
skilled /unskilled labor income ratio, which means labor income inequality, do not change at the 
steady state. However, when the innovation frontier shifts with capital accumulation, a rising 
population has a favorable influence on growth and the income distribution, as the population 
growth can expand the innovation possibility frontier outward because of its positive influence 
on capital accumulation. Thus, in some conditions, the increase in population growth can produce 
economic growth and decreases income inequality. However, the opposite case applies. In other 
words, a population decline, which is the relevant case in most advanced countries, is likely to 
lead to a fall in the growth rate and an increase in income inequality.  
Third, our analysis provides an implication for how the heterogeneity of population growth in 
both labor types affects the induced bias of innovation, growth, and distribution. If population 
growth in unskilled labor is larger than that in skilled labor, which means a scarcity of skilled 
labor in the growth process, skill-biased innovation can be introduced even at the steady state, 
which can then provide more growth. However, this is likely to produce greater income inequality.  
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. 
Section 3 analyzes the dynamic system and the implications for the induced skill-biased 
innovation and income inequality. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Basic Model 
2.1 Three-factor production function 
We consider a three-factor production function that is twice differentiable and 
homogeneous of degree one: 
1 1 2 2( , , )Y F A L A L BK= ,                          (1) 
where Y is output, L1 is skilled labor, L2 is unskilled labor, K is capital stock, A1 is skilled labor 
efficiency, A2 is unskilled labor efficiency and B is capital efficiency. 
We assume that this three-factor production function is a weakly separable sub-
                                                     
8 See Ciccone and Peri (2005). In the two-factor case, if the elasticity of substitution between 
skilled and unskilled labor is larger than unity, the steady state may always be unstable and thus 
the induced skill-biased innovation can raise the income of skilled labor over time. 
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aggregate production function. For the production function, we specify a nested two-level 
CES production function that has two elasticity parameters: the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and skilled labor σ1 and the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
unskilled labor σ2: 
Y = F (L1, L2, K) 
= [[δ2{δ1L1( 1 – σ1)/σ1+ (1 – δ1)K} (1 – σ1)/σ1](1 – σ2)σ1/(1 – σ1)σ2 + (1 – δ2)L2(1 – σ2)/σ2]σ2/(1 – σ2)  (2) 
In this specification, σ2 > σ1 provides a capital–skill complementarity technology9 that 
has been widely estimated (Krusell et al., 2000; Hornstein et al., 2005), and we deal with 
this ongoing technical progress. In particular, our analysis focuses on inequalities in 
empirically relevant capital–skill complementarity σ2 > 1 > σ1.10  
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, we can rewrite the production function as 
follows: 
1 1 2 2( / , / )Y BKf A L BK A L BK=                       (3) 
Since we consider the long-run perfect competitive economy that has full employment, we simply 
denote 1 2,L L  as follows: 
1 2, (1 )L uL L u L= = −                                            (4) 
where 1( / )u L L≡ is a proportion of skilled labor supply in total labor supply L . From (3), output 
per capital ( / )y Y K≡  is then described as 
    ]/)1(,/[ BxuBucxBfy −=                        (5) 
where 1 2( / )c A A≡  is the skilled/unskilled labor efficiency ratio and 2( / )x A L K≡  is the 
effective labor/capital ratio evaluated by unskilled labor efficiency. Over time, the movement of 
the induced skill-biased innovation represents the dynamics of c and capital accumulation 
represents the dynamics of x. Later, we examine the dynamics of these two variables. 
In the long-run economy, the skilled wage w1 and unskilled wage w2 are competitively 
determined as their own marginal products. In this setting, the skilled wage rate w1 and 
unskilled wage rate w2 are given by 1 1 1 1/w F L A f= ∂ ∂ =  and 2 2 2 2/w F L A f= ∂ ∂ =  , 
                                                     
9 Defining cij ≡ FijF /FiFj as the partial elasticity of the complementarity between i and j, capital– 
skill complementarity is described as an inequality in which the elasticity of complementarity 
between capital and skilled labor is larger than that between capital and unskilled labor c1K ( = 
F1KF /F1FK ) > c2K ( = F2KF /F2FK ). In our two-level CES production technology, σ2 > σ1 
implies c1K > c2K since c1K – c2K = (σ1–1 – σ2–1)/(1 – F2L2/F). Thus, σ2 > σ1 implies capital–skill 
complementarity. In addition, in our three-factor case, the elasticity of substitution is not always 
equal to the inverse of the elasticity of complementarity. Specifically, c1K = (σ1–1 – σ2–1)/(1 – 
F2L2/F) + σ2 –1 ≠ σ1–1 although c2K = σ2 –1. 
10 See Duffy et al. (2004) and Hornstein et al. (2005). 
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respectively. Therefore, wage inequality 1 2( / )w wω ≡  and labor income inequality
1 1 2 2/ ( / )a b w L w L≡ , implying the labor share ratio, are described respectively as follows: 
      1 2/f c fω = , 1 1 2 2 1 2/ / / { / (1 )}a b w L w L f c f u u= = −                    (6) 
where a is the skilled labor share and b is the unskilled labor share. The movements in 
wage inequality and income inequality synchronize as long as the proportion of labor is constant; 
in other words, no labor mobility across sectors occurs. 
 
2.2 Induced innovation frontier 
Consider the induced biased technologies in line with the Kennedy (1964) and Samuelson (1965) 
type. We focus on two augmenting technologies, namely skill-augmenting technology
1 1( / )A Aα ≡   and unskilled-augmenting technology 2 2( / )A Aβ ≡   , where the dot denotes 
dx/dt. Their rates of technical changes are given by the following innovation possibility 
frontier ( , , ) 0q gα β = , which is rewritten as  
( , )gβ β α= ,    βα < 0, βαα < 0, βg > 0, βαg > 0                    (7) 
Here, βα < 0 and βαα < 0 exhibit the concavity of the innovation frontier that implies the 
resource constraints devoted to these factor-biased technologies. Moreover, ( / )g K K≡ 
expresses capital accumulation and βg > 0 represents a shift in the innovation possibility 
frontier. 11 Following Adachi et al. (2019), we assume that this comes from the R&D 
activity embodied in the new capital stock, which can produce more possible biased technologies. 
We formulate this as the external effect of capital accumulation on the innovation frontier. Thus, 
βg > 0 expresses the expansion of the innovation frontier. Furthermore, we assume βαg 
> 0, implying that the equilibrium skill-augmenting technology is an increasing function 
of capital accumulation. Then, representative firms facing the innovation frontier aim 
to maximize the instantaneous cost reduction rate of change ( , )a b gα β α+   with 
respect to α, where a is the skilled labor share and b is the unskilled labor share. Solving 
this maximization problem yields ( , ) /g a bαβ α− = . This means that the tangency of 
the innovation possibility curve equivalent to the skilled/unskilled labor share ratio, 
implying income inequality, determines the equilibrium skill-biased innovation. This is 
explicitly shown as 
1
2
[ / , (1 ) / ]( , )
[ / , (1 ) / ](1 )
f ucx B u x B cug
f ucx B u x B uα
β α −− =
− −
                             (8) 
where 
                                                     
11 As noted before, Samuelson (1965) suggested that the capital share of income is one of the 
shift parameters at the innovation possibility frontier that has a tradeoff between capital-
augmenting and labor-augmenting technical progress. 
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1
1 1 1
[ / , (1 ) / ] // /
[ / , (1 ) / ]
f ucx B u c B ucx Ba w L Y f cux Bf
f ucx B u x B
−
= = =
−
                   (9) 
2
2 2 2
[ / , (1 ) / ](1 ) // (1 ) /
[ / , (1 ) / ]
f ucx B u x B u x Bb w L Y f u x Bf
f ucx B u x B
− −
= = − =
−
          (10) 
Equation (8) is solved for each equilibrium biased innovation *α and *β as follows. 
* ( , , , , )x c g B uα α=                                                (11a) 
   * [ ( , , , , ), ] ( , , , , )x c g B u g x c g B uβ β α β= =                            (11b) 
 
2.3 Dynamics 
We consider a standard Solow type neoclassical growth model. Under this model, aggregate 
savings determine investment and thus can provide capital accumulation. Then, the rate of change 
of the effective labor/capital ratio evaluated at unskilled labor efficiency /x x  and that of the 
skilled/unskilled labor efficiency ratio /c c  are given by 
2 2/ / / / [ / , (1 ) / ]x x A A L L K K n sBf ucx B u x Bβ= + − = + − −           (12) 
    2 2 1 1/ / /c c A A A A β α= − = −                       (13) 
where s represents the saving rate assumed to be simply constant and n is the rate of change in 
total labor supply implying population growth. Then, equations (12) and (13) give the following 
dynamic system: 
/ ( , ; , , ) [ / , (1 ) / ]x x x c g B u n sBf cux B u x Bβ= + − −                       (14) 
 / ( , ; , , ) ( , ; , , )c c x c g B u x c g B uα β= −                                  (15) 
[ / , (1 ) / ]g sBf cux B u x B= −                                           (16) 
The steady state is given by the solution to 
[ ( *, *; *, , ), *] [ * * / , (1 ) * / ]x c g B u g n sBf uc x B u x Bβ α + = −               (17) 
   ( *, *; *, , ) [ ( *, *; *, , ), *]x c g B u x c g B u gα β α=                            (18) 
    * [ * * / , (1 ) * / ]g sBf c ux B u x B= −                                      (19) 
At the steady state, there are the non-bias innovations: therefore, in our model, the skill-biased 
innovation appears only in the transitional case. However, even at the steady state, we can also 
have skill-biased innovation in the case of the heterogeneity of population growth, particularly 
when the population growth of unskilled labor is larger than that of skilled labor. In the next 
section, we analyze the properties of the dynamics and effects on the induced bias and inequalities. 
 
3. Analysis 
We first consider the stability of the dynamics and then analyze the comparative statics of income 
inequality, the induced bias innovation, and growth at the steady state. Finally, we investigate the 
implication of the heterogeneity of population growth. 
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3.1 Stability 
Before analyzing the dynamic system, we start by examining the properties of the equilibrium 
biased technologies. In equation (8), totally differentiating with respect to α, x, c, g, and B yields 
the following equation. 
11 1 1 12 2 1 21 1 2 22 2 2 11 1 1 21 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ( / / / / )( ) ( / / 1)f l f f l f f l f f l f x B f l f f l f cαα αβ α β α = + − − − + − +  
                                  ˆ( / )g g gα αβ β−                          (20) 
where ˆ( / )x dx x≡  denotes the percentage change in x and 1 1 1 2 2 2/ , /l A L BK l A L BK≡ ≡  . 
Based on our two-level CES production function, this equation is specified as follows:12 
1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1
1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( / ) ( )( ) ( ) ( / )
1 1 g
x B a a c g g
b bαα α α α
κβ α β α σ σ σ κσ κ β β− − − −= − − + − − + + −
− −
 
(21) 
where ( 1 )a bκ = − −  represents the capital share. Therefore, assuming capital–skill 
complementarity technology ( 2 1σ σ> ), we find the effect of these parameters on the equilibrium 
skill-biased innovation in the elasticity form as follows: 
1 1
2 1/ ( ) 01x
x
b
α
αα
β κα α σ σ
β α
− −= − <
−
                                     (22a) 
1 1
2 1
1/ ( )
1c
c a a
b
α
αα
βα α σ κσ κ
β α
− −= − − + +
−
                             (22b) 
/ 0gg g g
α
αα
β
α α
β α
−
= >                                                   (22c) 
1 1
2 1/ ( ) 01B
B
b
α
αα
β κα α σ σ
β α
− −−= − >
−
                                    (22d) 
Similarly, we find the effect of each parameter on the equilibrium unskilled-biased innovation in 
the elasticity form as follows: 
/ / 0x xx xαβ β β α β= >                                                 (23a) 
 / /c cc cαβ β β α β=                                                    (23b) 
/ ( ) /g g gg gαβ β β α β β= +                                              (23c) 
/ / 0B BB Bαβ β β α β= <                                                (23d) 
The results of x, c, and B come from the movement in the tradeoff relationship between skill-
augmenting and unskilled-augmenting technical progress at the innovation frontier. Thus, we have 
the converse effects on α   and β  . However, the results of g come from the shift in the 
                                                     
12  In our weakly separable two-level CES production technology, )2,1,(/ =jiflf jiij   are 
specified as follows: 1 1
11 1 1 1 2/ ( ) / (1 ) 0f l f ab bκσ σ
− −= − + − < , 112 2 1 2/ 0f l f bσ −= > , 
  1
21 1 2 2/ 0f l f aσ
−= >  , and 122 2 2 2/ (1 ) 0f l f b σ −= − − <  . Thus, these specifications lead to 
equation (21). 
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innovation frontier. This provides the possibility of increasing both α  and β  . In our later 
analysis of inequality, we see that these differences provide different outcomes.  
Here, an increase in x leads to a decrease in α , but an increase in β . However, increases in 
g and B lead to an increase in α but a decrease in β . A similar result applies to the effect of c, 
although this effect is ambiguous. However, the increase in c can sufficiently lead to a decrease 
in α  and therefore an increase in β  if the stability condition in (27) is satisfied. This stability 
condition corresponds to an elasticity of substitution less than unity in the two-factor case. In the 
three-factor, two-level CES case, some of the capital–skill complementarity in 12 1 σσ >>  and 
2 11 σ σ> >  provide the stability. In this case, the relative increase in skill-biased technology 
decreases the skill-biased innovation, which can produce stability. However, the effect of capital 
accumulation g produces different outcomes. We have a positive effect of g on both α  and β  
if 0gαβ >  and = 0g g gαβ β α β+ >   are provided. These expansion effects of capital 
accumulation play significant roles in the comparative statics of inequalities at the steady state. 
Now, let us consider the stability condition of the dynamics. Linearizing in equations (17) and 
(18) that incorporates (19) at the steady state and rearranging, we have the following dynamic 
matrix equation: 
( / ) ( ) ( / )( / ) / /
( / ) / /
(1 )( / ) ( ) (1 )( / )
x c
x c
x A a b c Aax x x dx xn n
c c c dc c
x B a b c Ba
n n
α α
α α
β α β αα α α α
δ δ β β
δ δ α αβ α α β α α
α α
 + + +    + + =   
    − + + − + 
+ + 


     
                                                                        (24) 
where 
1 1g g gA αβ α β β= + − = − ,                                              (25a) 
(1 ) g g g gB αβ α β α β= − − = −  .                                           (25b) 
Describing the matrix of the partial derivatives of the differential equations as J, the stability of 
the steady state is then locally satisfied when the trace of the matrix J is negative and the 
determinant of the matrix J is positive. With some calculation, the trace and determinant of the 
matrix are respectively given by 
   { / (1 ) / } ( )x ctrJ x c A a b Ban α α
α β α α β α α
α
= + − + + +
+
 
      1 1
2 12
1(1 ) ( ) 0
( ) (1 )g
a b a b b
n b b
α
α
αα
βαβ β σ κσ κ
α β
− − = − − − + − − + < + − 
   (26) 
   det { (1 ) }{ / ( ) / }x cJ B A a x a b cn α α
α β β α α α α
α
≡ ∆ = − − − +
+
 
  1 1
2 1
1 1(1 ) ( ) 0
1g
a b a b
n b
α
α
αα
β β β σ κσ κ
α β
− −= − − + − − >
+ −
            (27) 
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From these two inequalities, we have the following proposition about stability at the steady state. 
 
Proposition 1 
With endogenous factor-biased innovation that may shift because of capital accumulation in the 
three-factor, two-level CES production economy, the steady state is sufficiently stable if the 
expansion effect of the innovation frontier is weak and there is some capital–skill complementarity. 
Specifically, the steady state is sufficiently stable and oscillatory if  
     1 0gαβ β− − > , 
1 1
2 1 0a b a bσ κσ κ
− −+ − − >                           (28) 
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2] 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show Proposition 1 in the case of 1 0gαβ β− − > . We make three remarks. First, 
the two stability conditions imply that dynamic stability is produced by the stable stationary 
innovation frontier and some factor complementarity production technology. The latter case 
corresponds to an elasticity of substitution smaller than unity in the two-factor case. However, the 
former case is a new one. The implication is that the steady state becomes unstable even for some 
factor complementarity if gβ is so large such that the R&D associated with capital accumulation 
can produce more expansion at the frontier. However, if this is not likely to be the case over time, 
it is plausible to focus on the case of 1 0gαβ β− − > . In this case, Figure 1 shows Proposition 1 
in two kinds of elasticity of parameters spaces 1 11 2σ σ
− −− . 
Second, in the three-factor case, the steady state is stable in capital–skill complementarity 
2 11 σ σ> >  as well as in some empirically relevant capita–skill complementarity 12 1 σσ >> . 
The latter implies that even if the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is 
larger than unity, implying 
2 1σ > , which is the empirically relevant case,
13 the smaller elasticity 
of substitution between capital and skilled labor makes the steady state stable. Figure 2 shows the 
stability case in which convergence is oscillatory. However, if 1 12 1 0a b a bσ κσ κ− −+ − − <  , 
implying some factor substitutability, the steady state is unstable and the saddle point shown in 
Figure 3. This is the same as the elasticity of substitution being lager than unity in the two-factor 
case. In other words, in this case, skill-biased technology produces more skilled labor income and 
thus more skill-biased innovation. Hence, this induced innovation produces more income 
inequality if 1 12 1 0a b a bσ κσ κ− −+ − − <  , implying the larger substitutability between 
unskilled labor and capital even for some relevant capital–skill complementarity. 
 
                                                     
13 See Ciccone and Peri (2005). As noted in footnote 8, if the elasticity of substitution between 
skilled and unskilled labor is larger than unity, the steady state may always be unstable in the 
two-factor case. 
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[Insert Figure 3] 
 
Finally, this stability condition in unrelated to the aggregate elasticity of substitution between 
capital and overall labor σ A (= (a+ bκ)/(aσ1 – 1 + bκσ2 – 1) ).14 Indeed, even if the aggregate elasticity 
of substitution is smaller than unity, instability is likely to occur.15 This is because the innovation 
frontier does not contain capital-augmenting technology and thus the maximization of the 
instantaneous cost reduction rate of change does not focus on capital-biased innovation. Thus, if 
the innovation frontier has capital-augmenting technology and labor-augmenting technology in 
the three-factor case, an aggregate elasticity of substitution smaller than unity may play a crucial 
role in the stability condition. 
 
3.2 Comparative statics 
Analyzing the comparative statics at the steady state, we see that the factor substitutability and 
the expansion effect of the innovation frontier have a significant effect on the results of the 
analysis. First, we consider the case of the effective labor/capital ratio and skilled/unskilled 
efficiency ratio. Total differentiation in the steady state produces the following matrix: 
( / ) ( ) ( / ) /
/
/
(1 )( / ) ( ) (1 )( / )
x c
x c
x A a b c Aa dx x An n ds s
dc c B
x B a b c Ba
n n
α α
α α
β α β αα α α α
β β
α αβ α α β α α
α α
 + + +  −   + +  =   −    − + + − + 
+ + 
 
( / )
/ /
0(1 )( / )
B
B
nB Ac
n ndB B dn n
B Bc
n
α
α
β α α α
β β
α β α α
α
 − −    −+    ++ +     − − −   + 
 
 (29) 
We assume the stability condition >0∆  is satisfied. In this case, from this matrix, we obtain the 
following results for capital–skill complementarity technology: 
1 1
2 1
1 1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 ) ( ) 0
1g
x s a a
n b
α
α
αα
ββ β σ κσ κ
α β
− −= − − − − + + <
∆ + −
              (30a) 
1
1
1 1ˆˆ / (1 ) (1 ) 0gx B n
α
α
αα
ββ β κ σ
α β
−= − − − <
∆ +
                        (30b) 
1 1
2 1
1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 ) ( ) 0
1g
c s
n b
α
α
αα
β κβ β σ σ
α β
− −−= − − − >
∆ + −
                (31a) 
                                                     
14 σ A is derived in the appendix. 
15 See Figure 1. 
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1 1
2 1
1 1ˆˆ / (1 ) ( ) 0
1g
c B
n b
α
α
αα
β κβ β σ σ
α β
− −−= − − − >
∆ + −
                        (31b) 
1 1
2 1
1 1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 ) ( ) ( )
1 g g
nx n a a a
n n b
α
α
αα
ββ σ κσ κ α β
β α β
− − −= − − − + + + − ∆ + + − 

    (32a) 
1 1
2 1
1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 ) ( ) ( )
1 g g
nc n a
n n b
α
α
αα
β κβ σ σ α β
β α β
− − = − − + − ∆ + + − 

             (32b) 
Thus, both an increase in the saving rate and further capital-augmenting technical progress lead 
to a decrease in the effective labor/capital ratio evaluated at unskilled efficiency, but an increase 
in the skill/unskilled efficiency ratio. Alternatively, the effects of population growth on these two 
equilibrium variables are ambiguous. However, if the expansion effect of the frontier is small or 
the effects of capital accumulation on both α  and β  are similar, then the decline in population 
growth has the same influence on x and c. Specifically, the decline in population growth decreases 
the effective labor/capital ratio evaluated at unskilled efficiency, but increases the skill/unskilled 
efficiency ratio. Hence, skill-biased innovation occurs only on the transition path toward the new 
steady state (Figure 4). Therefore, even in the case of population growth, there is non-biased 
technical progress at the steady state. 
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
Next, let us consider the effects of the parameters on the labor shares, inequality, and biased 
technologies at the steady state. Table 1 summarizes the results. Total differentiation with respect 
to the skilled labor share a , unskilled labor share b , and aggregate labor share ( )Ls a b= +  in 
our specified production function provides the following equations: 
11 1 1 12 2 1 1 1 2 2 11 1 1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( / / 1 / / )( ) (1 / / )a f l f f l f f l f f l f x B f l f f l f c= + + − − − + + −  
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 2
1ˆˆ ˆ( 1 )( ) ( )
1 1
b b x B ab ab c
b b
κ σ σ κσ σ κ− − − −= − + − − + − − + +
− −
         (33) 
21 1 2 22 2 1 1 1 2 2 21 1 2 1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( / / 1 / / )( ) ( / / )b f l f f l f f l f f l f x B f l f f l f c= + + − − − + −  
1 1
2 2
ˆˆ ˆ(1 )( ) ( 1)x B a cκ σ σ− −= − − + −                                        (34) 
ˆˆ ˆL
a bs a b
a b a b
= +
+ +
                                                    (35) 
Taking account of (30) – (32) in the above equations, we have the following consequences in 
some empirically relevant capital–skill complementarity
2 1( 1 )σ σ> > .  
Concerning the saving rate and capital-augmenting technical progress, we find the same results 
because the frontier does not shift at the steady state: 
1 1
2 1
1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ/ / / (1 ) (1 )(1 ) 0L ga s b s s s n
α
α
αα
ββ β κ σ σ
α β
− −= = = − − − − <
∆ +
            (36) 
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1 1
2 1
1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ/ / / (1 ) (1 )(1 ) 0L ga B b B s B n
α
α
αα
ββ β κ σ σ
α β
− −= = = − − − − <
∆ +
        (37) 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ/ / 0a s b s− = ,  ˆˆ ˆˆ / / 0a B b B− =                                          (38) 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ/ / 0s sα β= = ,  ˆˆ ˆˆ / / 0B Bα β= =                                        (39) 
In other words, both an increase in the saving rates and the advancement of capital-augmenting 
technical progress decrease the skilled labor shares, unskilled labor share, and aggregate labor 
share at the same rates. Thus, the capital shares rise, but labor income inequality /a b does not 
occur. These results come from the fixity of the innovation possibility frontier at the steady state 
at which not shifting the innovation frontier provides the constancy of the tangency of frontier 
curve, which is equivalent to the labor/income ratio. Hence, the movement of the skilled labor 
shares can synchronize with that of the unskilled labor share and unbiased innovation occurs in 
at steady state. 
However, the consequences of population growth provide different outcomes because the 
innovation may expand because of capital accumulation. As a result, the shift in the innovation 
frontier has a positive influence on growth, which may affect income inequality. The results are 
given as follows: 
1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1
1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ( ) ( )
1g g
n ba n a a
n n b
α
α
αα
β β κ σ σ α β σ κσ κ
β α β
− − − − −= − − − + − + − − ∆ + + − 

                                     
                                                                        (40) 
1 1
2 1
1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )g g
nb n a
n n
α
α
αα
βσ β κ σ α β
β α β
− − −= − − − + − ∆ + + 

,             (41) 
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 2
1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 )(1 )(1 ) ( ) ( )
1 1L g g
n b as n
n n b
α
α
αα
βκ β σ σ α β σ σ
β α β κ
− − − − −= − − − + − − ∆ + + − − 

                            
                                                                        (42) 
1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ/ / ( )
1 g gg
a n b n nαα
α α
β α β
β β β
−
− = −
− −

,                                     (43) 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ/ / 0
1
g
g
nn n
α
β
α β
β β β
= = >
− −
.                                           (44) 
Specifically, in some relevant capita–skill complementarity, although the effects of population 
growth on each labor share become ambiguous because of the expansion effect, labor income 
inequality declines if its influence on skill-biased innovation is greater than that on unskilled-
biased innovation. Moreover, if the influence of the expansion frontier on each biased innovation 
is similar, population growth leads to decreases in the skilled labor share, unskilled labor share, 
and aggregate labor share. Further, we find a positive influence on both skill-biased and unskilled- 
biased innovations at the same rate, and thus a positive effect on growth. Conversely, in this case, 
a population decline provides the opposite outcomes. Summarizing the outcomes, we have the 
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following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2  
With endogenous factor-biased innovation that may shift because of capital accumulation in the 
three-factor case, with some relevant capital–skill complementarity technology, the following 
holds: 
1. Because, at the stable steady state, the change in the saving rate and advancement of capital-
augmenting technology cannot produce a shift in the innovation possibility frontier, neither 
skill-biased nor unskilled-biased innovation changes. Thus, labor income inequality does not 
occur, although the increase in the saving rate and advancement of capital-augmenting 
technical progress can lead to decreases in the skilled labor share, unskilled labor share, and 
aggregate labor share at the same rates. 
2. However, even at the stable steady state, because population growth may shift the innovation 
frontier, both skill-biased and unskilled-biased innovation can proportionally change. 
Therefore, population decline is likely to move the frontier inward, leading to decreases in the 
skilled labor share, unskilled labor share, and aggregate labor shares if the expansion effect 
of both skill-biased and unskilled-biased innovation is weak. Furthermore, an increase in 
income inequality can occur if the expansion effect of skill-biased innovation is larger than 
that of unskilled-biased innovation. 
 
 
Table 1.  Effects of the parameters on labor shares, inequality, and biased innovation 
 
x       c     a    b    Ls     /a b     α    β    g  
 
             s       −     +    −    −    −     0    0    0     0  
             B       −     +    −    −    −     0     0    0    0  
         n       d+    e−    d+   d+   d+   f−    +    +    +  
 
            Note: 12 1 σσ >> , 1 12 1 0a b a bσ κσ κ− −∆ = + − − >  
0, 0d e> <  if gg βα
~
≅ ,  0f <  if g gα β>  . 
 
In the stability case of the steady state, our outcomes for the labor shares at the steady state depend 
crucially on the property of some substitutability between capital and unskilled labor; in other 
words, some substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor among some relevant capital–  
skill complementarity technology 12 1 σσ >> . Conversely, even at the steady state, there is 
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some complementarity between capital and unskilled labor among capital–skill complementarity 
2 11 σ σ> > , and thus some outcomes can be reversed. 
 
3.3 Implications of the heterogeneity of population growth 
Finally, we consider the case of the heterogeneity of population growth. One of the weaknesses 
of our analysis thus far is that the steady state has no biased innovation, implying that skill-biased 
innovation is the equivalent to unskilled-biased innovation. However, even at the steady state in 
our framework, the equilibrium skill-biased innovation can be introduced if the population growth 
of unskilled labor is larger than that of skilled labor. This is likely to occur if the newly arrived 
technologies lead to the obsolescence of many types of skills, which implies an increasing number 
of unskilled workers (i.e., the greater scarcity of skilled labor in the growth process). 
To analyze this case, we modify our framework. Let 
1n  and 2n  denote the population growth 
of skilled labor and unskilled labor, respectively, and we assume that the population growth of 
unskilled labor is larger than that of skilled labor 2 1n n> . In this setting, rewriting output per 
capital leads to 
( / , / )y Bf cx B x B=                                                   (45) 
where 1 1 2 2( / )c A L A L≡  is the effective skilled/unskilled labor ratio and 2 2( / )x A L K≡  is the 
effective unskilled labor/capital ratio. Then, the dynamics of x  and c are given as follows: 
2/ ( / , / )x x n sBf cx B x Bβ= + −    ,  2 1/c c n nβ α= − + −         (46) 
Since the formulation of factor-biased innovation is the same, the solution to the maximization of 
the instantaneous cost reduction rate of change on the concavity of the innovation 
possibility frontier yields ( , ) /g a bαβ α− =  , which is shown as 
1
2
( / , / )( , )
( / , / )
f cx B x B cg
f cx B x Bα
β α− =
  
 
 . Thus, we have * ( , , , )x c g Bα α=    , 
* [ ( , , , ), ] ( , , , )x c g B g x c g Bβ β α β= =    . Therefore, the dynamics are explicitly given by 
2/ ( , , , ) ( / , / )x x x c g B n sBf cx B x Bβ= + −      ,                            (47a) 
 2 1/ ( , , , ) ( , , , )c c x c g B x c g B n nα β= − + −      .                              (47b) 
( / , / )g sBf cx B x B=                                                  (47c) 
Hence, the steady state is given by the solution to 
2( *, *, *, ) [ * * / , * / ]x c g B n sBf c x B x Bβ + =                               (48) 
    
1 2( *, *, *, ) ( *, *, *, )x c g B n x c g B nα β+ = +                                (49) 
    * ( * * / , * / )g sBf c x B x B=    .                                         (50) 
 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 
Figure 5 illustrates this steady state. As far as 2 1n n>  , we have
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( *, *, *, ) ( *, *, *, )x c g B x c g Bα β>    . In other words, in this case, more skill-biased innovation is 
introduced because the scarcity of skilled labor induces firms to promote skill-augmenting 
technology. Moreover, purely skill-biased innovation can appear if the population growth of 
unskilled labor is high such that the upward line satisfying 1 2n nα β+ = +  intersects with point 
0α  on the innovation frontier in Figure 5. 
In addition, we can see the consequences of the population growth in unskilled labor at the 
steady state. Calculating the comparative statics provides the following results:16 
1 12
2 2 1
2 1
1 1 1ˆ ˆ/ ( ) (1 )
1 g
nx n a a a
n n b
α
αα
β σ κσ κ α
β α β
− − −= − − + + + − ∆ + + − 

         (51a) 
1 12
2 2 1
2 1
1 1ˆ ˆ/ ( ) (1 )
1 g
nc n a
n n b
α
αα
β κ σ σ α
β α β
− − = − − − ∆ + + − 

                   (51b) 
1 1 1 12
2 2 1 2 1
2 1
1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( )
1g
n ba n a a
n n b
α
αα
β κ σ σ α σ κσ κ
β α β
− − − − −= − − + − + − − ∆ + + − 
 
(52) 
1 12
2 2 1
2 1
1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 ) (1 ) (1 )g
nb n a
n n
α
αα
βσ κ σ α
β α β
− − −= − − + − ∆ + + 
,                   (53) 
1 1 1 12
2 2 1 1 2
2 1
1 1ˆ ˆ/ (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( )
1 1L g
n b as n
n n b
α
αα
βκ σ σ α σ σ
β α β κ
− − − − −= − − + − − ∆ + + − − 
 (54) 
2 2 2
1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ/ / (1 )
1 gg
a n b n nαα
α α
β α
β β β
− = −
− −
                                     (55), 
2
2
1ˆ ˆ/ 0
1 g
nn
α
α
β β α
= >
− −
.                                                 (56) 
2
2
ˆ ˆ/
1
g
g
nn α
α
β β
β
β β β
+
=
− −
                                                     (57) 
2
2 2
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ/ / ( )
(1 ) gg
nn n α
α
α β β β α β α
αβ β β
− = − −
− −
                              (58) 
From these, we have Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3 
With endogenous factor-biased innovation that may shift because of capital accumulation in the 
three-factor case, with some relevant capital–skill complementarity technology as well as 
relatively large population growth in unskilled labor, the following holds: 
If the population growth of unskilled labor is larger than that of skilled labor, skill-biased 
innovation can be introduced at the steady state. In the stable steady state, the increase in the 
population growth of unskilled labor can lead to expanding the frontier, resulting in more growth 
                                                     
16 The details are available on request. 
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and skill-biased innovation if the expansion effect of unskilled-biased innovation is small. 
However, larger population growth of unskilled labor can lead to a greater increase in the skilled 
labor share than in the unskilled labor share, and thus may result in more labor income inequality 
if the expansion effect of skill-biased innovation is small.  
 
We obtain our results when the population of skilled labor is relatively scarce and the innovation 
possibility frontier is rather stationary. Therefore, if skilled labor supply is increasing, and the 
expansion effect of the innovation frontier is large, some outcomes may be reversed. However, if 
capital-augmenting technology such as automation and artificial intelligence technologies can 
play the same roles for skilled workers and influence the expansion of the innovation possibility 
frontier significantly as well as change the capital–skill complementarity structure, the 
consequences of our analysis may lead to different outcomes.17 Then, an alternative framework 
such as formulating endogenous capital-augmenting technical progress may be needed. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, based on a three-factor, two-level CES production function that has capital–skill 
complementarity, we developed an endogenous skill-biased innovation model based on the 
neoclassical growth model to analyze the dynamics of income inequalities. Extending the 
innovation possibility frontier that has a skill-biased innovation type, we showed that some 
relevant capital–skill complementarity technology and the possible shift in the innovation frontier 
because of capital accumulation play significant roles in the stability of the steady state and the 
behaviors of labor shares and inequalities. We also showed that relatively large population growth 
of unskilled labor can introduce more skill-biased innovation and thus raise income inequality. 
However, to investigate the implications of automation and artificial intelligence technologies on 
growth, inequality, and unemployment, an alternative formulation of endogenous capital-
augmenting technical progress and its analysis are needed. These issues will be addressed in future 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 See Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Berg et al. (2018). 
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Appendix 
Aggregate elasticity of substitution 
We can derive the endogenous elasticity of substitution as follows. w/r is given by the following 
equation: 
w/r = {uw1 + (1 – u) w2} / {f (l1, l2) – f1(l1, l2) l1 – f2(l1, l2) l2}                 (A1) 
   = v (l1, l2, u) 
In this case, l1 = u/k and l2 = (1 – u)/k, where k≡K/L. Denoting θl1k ≡ (k/l1)(d/l1/dk), θl2k ≡ 
(k/l2)(d/l2/dk), we have the following equations: 
θl1k = –1 and θl2k = – 1                                             (A2) 
Moreover, defining η1 ≡ (l1/v) ∂v/∂l1, η2 ≡ (l2/v) ∂v/∂l2, the aggregate elasticity of substitution σ A is 
then written as 
σ A ≡ [(w/r)/k]dk/d(w/r)                                               (A3) 
= {(k/v) dv/dk} – 1  
= (η1θl1k  + η2θl2k ) – 1  
    = (– η1 – η2) – 1 
Calculating η1 ≡ (l1/v) ∂v/∂l1 and η2 ≡ (l2/v) ∂v/∂l2, and specifying these in our two-level CES 
production function yield 
η1 = (bσ2 – 1 – σ1 – 1) a/(a + bκ), η2 = – σ2 – 1b/(a + b) < 0.                        (A4) 
Thus, the aggregate elasticity of substitution is given by  
σ A = (– η1 – η2) – 1   
= (a+ bκ)/(aσ1 – 1 + bκσ2 – 1)                                   (A5) 
 
 
 
19 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D. (2002), “Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market,” Journal of 
Economic Literature 40, pp.7-72. 
Acemoglu (2010), “When does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation?” Journal of Political 
Economy 118, pp.1037-1078. 
Acemoglu, D. (2015), “Localised and Biased Technologies: Atkinson and Stiglitz’s New View, 
Innovation, and Directed Technological Change,” Economic Journal 125, pp. 443-463. 
Acemoglu, D. and P. Restrepo (2017a), “The Race between Man and Machine: Implications of 
Technology for Growth, Factor Shares and Employment,” American Economic Review, 
forthcoming. 
Acemoglu, D. and P. Restrepo (2017b), “Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets,” 
NBER Working Papers, 23285. 
Acemoglu, D. and P. Restrepo (2018) “Modeling Automation,” American Economic Review, 
Paper and Proceedings, February.  
Adachi, H, T. Nakamura, K. Inagaki, and Y. Osumi, (2019) Technological Progress, 
Income Distribution, and Unemployment: -Theory and Empirics-, Springer Briefs 
in Economics. 
Berg, A., E. Buffie and F. Zanna, (2018), “Should We Fear the Robot Revolution? (The Correct 
Answer is Yes),” IMF Working Paper, 18/116. 
Caselli, F. and W.J. Coleman II (2006), “The World Technology Frontier,” American Economic 
Review 96, pp. 499-523. 
Ciccone, A. and G. Peri (2005),"Long-Run Substitutability between More and Less Educated 
Workers: Evidence from a Panel of Countries," Review of Economics and Statistics 87, 
pp.652-63. 
Drandakis, E. M. and E. S. Phelps (1966), “A Model of Induced Invention, Growth, and 
Distribution,” Economic Journal 76, pp. 823-840. 
Duffy, J., C. Papageorgiou and F. Perez-Sebastian (2004), “Capital-Skill Complementarity? 
Evidence from a Panel of Countries,” Review of Economics and Statistics 86, pp.327-44. 
Graetz, G. and G. Michaels (2015), “Robots at Work,” CEPR Discussion Paper 1335. 
Griliches, Z. (1969), “Capital-Skill Complementarity”, Review of Economics and Statistics 51, 
pp.465-468. 
Hornstein, A., P. Krusell and G. L. Violante (2005), “The Effects of Technical Change on Labor 
Market Inequalities,” in P. Aghion and S. N. Durlauf eds. Handbook of Economic Growth 
Vol.1B North-Holland, pp.1275-1370. 
Kennedy, C. (1964), “Induced Bias in Innovation and the Theory of Distribution,” Economic 
Journal 74, pp. 541-547.  
20 
 
Kotlikoff, L. and J. D. Sachs (2012), “Smart Machines and Long-Term Misery,” NBER Working 
Paper 18629. 
Korinek, A. and Stiglitz, J. E. (2017), “Artificial Intelligence and Implications for Income 
Distribution and Unemployment,” NBER Working Paper 24174. 
Krusell, P., L. E. Ohanian, J-V. Rios-Rull and G. L. Violante (2000), “Capital-Skill 
Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis,” Econometrica 68, pp. 1029-
1053. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1973), “Some Skeptical Thoughts on the Theory of Induced Innovation,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, pp.208-219. 
Samuelson, P. (1965), “A Theory of Induced Innovation along Kennedy-Weizacker Lines,” 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 33, pp.133-146. 
Sato, K. (1967), “A Two-Level Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution Production Function,” Review 
of Economic Studies 34, pp. 201-18. 
Solow, R. M. (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 43, pp.65-94. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2014), “Unemployment and Innovation,” NBER Working Paper 20670. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    σ2-1 
 
                                                       σ2 = σ1 
                σA =1 
 
 
 
 1+bκ/a   ①     
 
                                            1 > σ2 > σ1 
     ② 
     1 
 
                                                      σ2 >1 >> σ1  
                     σ2 > σ1 >1  
                            
                           
                                                                          σ1-1 
 
                             1             1+bκ/a                      1+a/bκ 
    
                    Figure 1 Stability condition 
  ① det J > 0 if κκσσ baba +>+ −− 11
1
2  
       ②  trJ < 0 
                    1 11 2( ) / ( )
A a b a bσ κ σ κσ− −= + +  
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    c 
 
 
 
                 ?̇?𝑐 = 0 
 
 
 
                                           
 
 
 
                                      E 
 
 
 
                                                    
                                                                     ?̇?𝑥 = 0 
 
                                                                            x 
 
                 Figure 2  Stable case 
det J > 0 if κκσσ baba +>+ −− 11
1
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
    c 
 
 
 
            ?̇?𝑥 = 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      E 
 
 
 
                                                    
                                                                     ?̇?𝑐 = 0 
 
                                                                            x 
 
                 Figure 3  Unstable case 
det J < 0 if κκσσ baba +<+ −− 11
1
2  
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    c 
 
 
 
              ?̇?𝑐 = 0      ?̇?𝑐’ = 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              E’ 
 
 
 
                                               E       ?̇?𝑥 = 0          ?̇?𝑥’ = 0 
 
                                                                            x 
 
               Figure 4  Stable case ( κκσσ baba +>+ −− 11
1
2 ) 
                     ↑↓↑⇒↑ cxBs ,,  
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          β 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     β*.…..………………..……….  E 
 
 
                                            -a/b 
              450 
         0              n2-n1       α*        α0               α 
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